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This paper describes the composition and distribution of household wealth in Italy.
First, the evolution of household portfolios over the last forty years is described on the basis
of newly reconstructed aggregate balance sheets. Second, the characteristics and quality of
the main statistical source on wealth distribution, the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household
Income and Wealth, are examined together with the statistical procedures used to adjust for
non-response, non-reporting and under-reporting. The distribution of household net worth is
then studied using both adjusted and unadjusted data. Wealth inequality is found to have
risen steadily during the 1990s. The increased concentration of financial wealth was an
important factor in determining this path.
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1
Like other major economies, in the second half of the 1990s Italy recorded an
exceptional rise in share prices, which came after a decade of oscillations around a flattened
trend (Figure 1). In March 2000 the MIB index peaked at 3.2 times the value it had recorded
at the end of 1996. Following this buoyant performance, in December 2000 the value of
company shares and mutual funds held by Italian households exceeded 1,000 billion euros,
or 40 per cent of their financial assets. Within the next two years, however, share prices fell
abruptly. The MIB index lost two fifths of its value, and holdings of risky assets in
households’ portfolios decreased to 640 billion euros.
Figure 1
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Source: 6KDUH￿SULFHV: monthly averages of the MIB index from the Bank of Italy database. +RXVLQJ￿SULFHV:
semi-annual series of the average price per square meter of new houses as estimated by Muzzicato,
Sabbatini and Zollino (2002).
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Francesco Paternò, Luigi Federico Signorini and Jay Zagorsky and participants in the 27th General Conference
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Housing prices have moved differently. They more than doubled between 1987 and
1993. After a short-lived reduction, they exhibited little variation until mid-2000, when they
reverted to a new phase of steep growth. These wide changes in relative asset prices may be
assumed to have had considerable influence on the distribution of household wealth. Were
the gains from the stock market boom of the late 1990s spread across many families, or were
they concentrated in the hands of few investors? What about the subsequent sharp
contraction? What are the distributive implications of variations in housing prices?
In this paper we address these questions by investigating the distribution of wealth
among Italian households and its evolution from 1989 to 2000. A major difficulty we have to
cope with is the quality of available data. However uninformative on distributive aspects, the
aggregate balance sheets of the household sector would provide a natural starting point.
Unfortunately, despite a centennial research tradition,
2 there are no estimates, official or
unofficial, of the aggregate wealth of Italian households. Financial Accounts have been
published by the Bank of Italy since the early 1960s, albeit with discontinuities; tangible
assets were only estimated in few occasional studies (e.g. Tresoldi and Visco, 1975; Banca
d’Italia, 1986; Marotta, 1988; Pagliano and Rossi, 1992). Microeconomic evidence is also
sparse. Micro-level data on family holdings of real and financial assets have been gathered
since the late 1960s in the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW),
but the complete balance sheet of respondents has only been collected starting with the 1987
wave. As argued below, this information is not without flaws. However, it has been widely
used to study the economic behaviour of Italian households, an example being the volume
edited by Ando, Guiso and Visco (1994). It was the basis for the few recent studies on
wealth distribution in Italy (e.g. Cannari and D’Alessio, 1994; Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2000).
In this paper we devote considerable effort to dealing with statistical issues, in order to
remedy the deficiencies of our sources. First, we assemble our own estimates of the balance
sheets of consumer households.
3 This evidence allows us not only to provide a benchmark
                                                        
2  Investigations were spurred by Pantaleoni’s (1890) attempt to estimate the private wealth of Italy from
information on estate duties. Alternative estimates were subsequently derived by direct inventory of assets and
liabilities. Zamagni (1980) briefly reviews this literature and assembles the figures for the period 1874-1938.
Goldsmith and Zecchini (1999) reconstruct the balance sheets for selected years between 1861 and 1973.
3  They draw on work conducted by one of the authors (AB) in collaboration with Salvatore Muzzicato.9
for microeconomic figures, but also to show how households’ portfolios have changed over
the last four decades. Second, we implement several procedures to correct the SHIW
microdata for non-response, non-reporting and under-reporting, and we present results for
adjusted and unadjusted data alike. The consideration of both sets of results helps to verify
the robustness of our conclusions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the composition of households’
portfolios according to aggregate data (details regarding their estimation are provided in
Appendix A). The characteristics and quality of the SHIW microeconomic data are
examined in Section 3. This section also illustrates the adjustment procedures, more
precisely described in Appendix B, and their impact. Section 4 reports microeconomic
figures on household wealth and its relation to age, work status and region of residence.
Wealth inequality is studied in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Our main findings are that
inequality of household net worth rose steadily during the 1990s and that it was especially
the increased concentration of financial wealth that determined such a path.
￿￿￿7KH￿FRPSRVLWLRQ￿RI￿KRXVHKROG￿QHW￿ZRUWK￿LQ￿PDFUR￿HVWLPDWHV
In Italian macroeconomic statistics the “household sector” has been typically broken
down into the two sub-sectors “sole proprietorships” and “consumer households”, purporting
to separate the productive activity of small businesses from the accounts of households as
consumption units. Here we follow this tradition by concentrating on consumer households.
We describe in Appendix A the methods we used to estimate their balance sheets from two
main sources, the Financial Accounts and the National Accounts (hence the label FANA
used throughout the paper). It is important to bear in mind that there are important
discontinuities which only in some cases we were able to remedy. Our estimates are
therefore to be taken with caution. They are meant to offer a broad view of the evolution of
Italian households’ wealth in the last forty years as well as to provide an aggregate
benchmark for the subsequent analysis based on individual data.
Household wealth is defined as the total market value of dwellings, consumer durable
goods and financial assets, net of debts. Equities include unlisted shares and non-corporate
equities, but not the value of small unincorporated businesses. The values of life insurance10
and private pension funds, and public pension rights are also not included. We estimate that
the net worth of Italian households amounted to 6,100 billion euros at the end of 2000,
4 or
5.2 times the gross domestic product. In 1965 the same ratio was 2.5. On the whole, between
1965 and 2000 household wealth went up by 5.8 per cent per year in real terms, i.e. after
deflating by the consumer price index in December of each year. Real net worth SHU￿FDSLWD
increased by an average 5.5 per cent each year, from 16,400 to 105,400 euros at 2000 prices.
The largest part of household net worth is made up of dwellings. In the last forty years,
their share in total wealth has fluctuated between 51 and 66 per cent (Figure 2, top panel).
The stock of durable goods has gradually declined from 16 to less than 9 per cent of total net
worth. The weight of tangible assets as a whole has shown a modest tendency to fall, to the
benefit of financial assets: fitting a linear trend, the share of financial assets appears to have
grown by about 1 percentage point every ten years. Lastly, financial liabilities have remained
low for most of the period: they accounted for about 2 per cent of net worth until the mid-
1990s. They subsequently increased to 3.6 per cent in 2002.
Important reallocations of households’ portfolios towards financial assets took place
during the last two economic expansions. The share of financial assets rose from 26 to 38 per
cent between 1982 and 1989, and from 34 to 43 between 1995 and 2000. The first increase
was mainly associated with the spread of direct ownership of government bonds and
Treasury bills: from below 2 per cent up to 1977, their share grew to 4 per cent in 1982 and
to a peak of 11 per cent in 1988; it then gradually diminished and has held steady at around 3
per cent since 1999 (Figure 2, mid panel). The second shift was instead driven by equities
and mutual funds (Figure 2, bottom panel). The importance of equities in households’
portfolios was already rising in the mid-1980s, but stock holdings doubled from 5 to 10 per
cent of net worth between 1995 and 2000, in parallel with the stock market boom and the
rapid privatisation of state-owned corporations and public utilities. Over the same five years,
the proportion of household wealth held in mutual funds rose from 1 to 7 per cent. In both
episodes, however, the portfolio reallocations were not lasting, as they were followed by a
quick, if incomplete, return to previous allocation between tangible and financial assets. The
                                                        
4 All money values are reported in the paper in euros, using the irreversible parity of 1,936.27 Italian lire
to 1 euro. The terms “wealth” and “net worth” are used interchangeably throughout the paper.11
diversification into government bonds in the 1980s, and equities and mutual funds in the
1990s, had more permanent effects on the composition of the financial portfolio, since it
overlapped with the long-run decline in the share of transaction and savings accounts in net
worth, from 19 per cent in the late 1970s to below 10 in 2000-02.
Figure 2
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Source: see Appendix A.12
As a result of the recent evolution, “in 1998 the portfolio of Italian households was
much more strongly tilted toward risky assets than it had ever been in the past” (Guiso and
Jappelli, 2002, p. 253). Despite theses changes, the wealth composition of Italian households
stands out in an international perspective for the high shares of tangible assets and cash and
transactions accounts, for the low diffusion of life insurance and pension funds, and for the
very modest level of indebtedness (e.g. Paiella, 2004; Magri, 2002; Faiella and Neri, 2004).
Supply-side factors have traditionally played an important role. In the early 1990s
Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1994, p. 23) remarked that: “regulations, high downpayments
for the purchase of durables and housing, wide interest rate spreads and limited competition
make it considerably more difficult to obtain access to credit and insurance in Italy than in
almost all other industrialized countries of comparable level of development”. This situation
changed in the following years, when increased competition among financial intermediaries
lowered entry costs, stimulated the diversification of assets and eased the access to credit,
and the extensive privatisation of state-owned companies helped the growth of the stock
market (Guiso and Jappelli, 2002; Casolaro, Gambacorta and Gobbi, 2004). Other factors
contribute. The prominence of residential housing in household portfolios reveals a strong
preference for owner-occupation, which is only in part attributable to the imperfections of
the rental market and the presence of borrowing constraints (Di Addario, 2002; Paiella,
2002).
5 The low level of consumer credit may reflect the smaller share of large retailers in
commercial distribution than in other countries (Casolaro, Gambacorta and Guiso, 2004).
￿￿￿7KH￿%DQN￿RI￿,WDO\¶V￿6XUYH\￿RI￿+RXVHKROG￿,QFRPH￿DQG￿:HDOWK
The main source of information on household wealth at the micro level is the Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), conducted by the Bank of Italy yearly from 1965
to 1987 (except for 1985), every other year until 1995 and then in 1998 and 2000 (the
reference is to the year IRU which, not LQ which, the survey is conducted).
￿The SHIW gathers
information on household microeconomic behaviour. Detailed data have been collected
                                                        
5 Borrowing constraints are correlated with the effectiveness of judicial procedures to recover the collateral
of defaulting borrowers. In regions where such procedures are more efficient, the probability of rationing is
found to be lower (e.g. Guiso and Jappelli, 1991; Magri, 2002; Fabbri and Padula, 2004).13
continually on the social and demographic characteristics of household members, their
incomes and, since 1980, their consumption expenditure. Estimates of households’ tangible
assets are also available from the outset, whereas financial assets have been surveyed
irregularly. The latter have been recorded on a regular basis since 1987, although their
comparability over time is lessened by changes in the format of the questions. Records used
in this paper relate to 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 and are drawn from the
Historical Archive (HA) of the survey (Version 2.1, released in January 2003).
The sample size is about 8,000 units per year. The basic survey unit is the
“household”, defined as a group of individuals linked by ties of blood, marriage or affection,
sharing the same dwelling and pooling all or part of their incomes. Institutional population is
not included. Data are collected in personal interviews conducted by professionally-trained
interviewers. Participation is voluntary and not remunerated. As a result, non-response is
high. In the last six waves the response rate, net of units not found at the available address,
ranged between a minimum 43.3 per cent in 2000 and a maximum 72.0 per cent in 1993.
Thus, not only the level but also the variability of the response rate is a matter of some
concern. It must be observed, however, that item non-response is relatively small, since
interviewers are not paid for the questionnaires where answers to the main questions, among
which wealth holdings, are missing.
6 Further methodological details on the SHIW are given
in Banca d’Italia (2000, 2002a), Brandolini and Cannari (1994) and Brandolini (1999).
￿￿￿￿ :HDOWK￿GDWD￿LQ￿WKH￿6+,:
We define household net worth from the SHIW as the total value of tangible assets
(consumer durable goods, jewellery and other valuables, real estate, businesses) and
financial assets (transaction and savings accounts, government bonds, equities and other
                                                        
6  Non-response is a problem common to all sample surveys on household wealth, though it appears to be
somewhat more pronounced in the SHIW. Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and Surette (2000, p. 28) report that in
the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances in both 1995 and 1998 the response rate was about
70 per cent in the basic sample and 35 per cent in the special section over-sampling the very rich; it fell to 10
per cent among the (likely) wealthiest families. In the wealth survey of Statistics Finland the response rates
were 72.5 per cent in 1987, 75.2 in 1994 and 64.9 in 1998 (Jäntti, 2002, Table 1, p. 6). In the Swedish
household panel survey, Klevmarken (2001, p. 4) notices that the share of imputed items increased from little
less than 20 per cent in the 1980s to about 30 per cent in 1998.14
assets), net of financial liabilities (mortgages and other debts). We do not include cash and
currency, severance pay (WUDWWDPHQWR￿GL￿ILQH￿UDSSRUWR), social security wealth, and the cash
values of life insurance and private retirement accounts because they are not recorded in the
survey.
7 On the other hand, we include valuables and businesses which were not accounted
for in aggregate estimates. Note that businesses cover firms, both incorporated and
unincorporated, where respondents do some work. We stick to the standard practice of
considering these businesses to be tangible assets because their value is closely linked to the
work of the proprietors, while company shares held simply as a form of saving are classified
among financial assets. Wealth components are recorded in the SHIW as follows.
•   &RQVXPHU￿GXUDEOH￿JRRGV￿￿MHZHOOHU\￿DQG￿RWKHU￿YDOXDEOHV. – Respondents are asked to
provide their best estimate of the monetary value at the end of the year preceding the
interview for three categories of durable goods: precious objects (jewellery, old and gold
coins, works of art, antiques), means of transport (cars, motorbikes, caravans, boats,
bicycles) and furniture, furnishing, household appliances and sundry articles.
•   5HDO￿HVWDWH. – Dwellings, non-residential buildings and land are subjectively evaluated by
respondents. For instance, all interviewees are asked the following question: “In your
opinion, what price could you ask for the dwelling in which you live (if sold
unoccupied)? In other words, how much is it worth (including any cellar, garage or
attic)?”. For home-owners, the answer provides the value of their principal residence.
8
Similar questions are asked for every piece of real estate, considered separately,
possessed by the household at the end of the previous year.
                                                        
7  In 2000 the proportions of Italian households holding life insurance and private pensions were 20 and 12
per cent, respectively. Imputing cash values on the SHIW information, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) estimate
that in 1995 life insurance accounted for 10 per cent of household financial wealth (as defined in their paper)
and private pension funds for 4 per cent; the corresponding figures in 1989 were 5 and 2 per cent.
8 For  recently  built or renovated houses, prices per square meter implicit in the SHIW evaluations can be
compared with the corresponding market prices as recorded in a survey of actual sales conducted among estate
agents (see Muzzicato, Sabbatini and Zollino, 2002, for details on this source). On average, the SHIW
subjectively-perceived prices underestimate actual prices by 10 to 20 per cent. However, the comparison is not
entirely homogeneous: actual prices refer to houses that were never occupied, whereas the SHIW evaluates
mostly occupied houses. The SHIW and actual prices fall roughly in line when the latter are reduced by the
discount factors reported in estate agent publications to allow for earlier occupation.15
•   %XVLQHVVHV.  – The valuation of businesses is particularly delicate, since in Italy the
percentage of self-employed labour force is among the highest in OECD countries. The
SHIW adopts two methods. Members of the professions, sole proprietors, free-lancers,
and members of family businesses are asked how much their firm would be worth should
they sell it. This value must include any equipment used, stocks and goodwill and must
exclude the value of buildings and land. Active shareholders and partners in incorporated
firms are asked to indicate the market value, at the end of the previous year, of their own
share in the firm. These values are those underlying our figures.
9
•   )LQDQFLDO￿DVVHWV. – The range of financial assets listed in the questionnaire expanded
over the years, mostly driven by financial innovation and portfolio diversification. In the
last wave, 25 different categories were specified. Moreover, the formulation of the
questions varied over the years. In 1989, amounts were inferred indirectly by asking
respondents the percentage composition of their household’s total wealth together with
the amount held in checking accounts. In subsequent surveys, respondents were asked to
choose among 15 brackets the one corresponding to the amount held of each asset. In
1998 and 2000 they were also asked for point estimates. Whenever missing, we
approximate the point estimate with the mid-point of the interval. We also include among
financial assets credits vis-à-vis relatives or friends not living in the house and the trade
credits towards customers of professionals, free-lancers, sole proprietors and family
businesses. All values refer to the end of the previous year.
                                                        
9  Alternatively, using the SHIW data, family businesses and firms of professionals, free-lancers and sole
proprietors could be valued as expected proceeds from selling the activity plus the value of buildings and land
used in the activity plus net trade credits less activity-related debts. With this definition, the household wealth
total would not change, but its composition would be affected by the re-classification of some items: the value
of buildings and land would be subtracted from other real estate, trade credits toward customers from financial
assets, and debts and trade debits to suppliers from liabilities. This alternative definition is probably more
consistent with the recommendations of the new system of national accounts: “A balance sheet is also needed
for the quasi-corporation showing the value of its fixed assets – land, buildings, machinery and equipment,
inventories – used in production and also the financial assets and liabilities – owned or incurred in the name of
the enterprise – bank deposits, overdrafts, trade credit and debits, other receivables or payables, etc. It is
assumed that the owner’s net equity in a quasi-corporation is equal to the difference between the value of its
assets and the value of its other liabilities so that the net worth of the quasi-corporation is always zero in
practice” (Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts, 1993, p. 94).16
•   ’HEWV. – Outstanding debts at the end of the year preceding the interview are recorded in
the same manner since 1987. They include: debts serving to meet needs of the household,
distinguished by type of purchase (buildings and restructuring, jewellery, motor vehicles,
furniture and electrical appliances, and non-durable goods such as holidays); debts vis-à-
vis relatives or friends not living in the house; debts connected with the business activity
and the trade credits of suppliers for professionals, free-lancers, sole proprietors and
family businesses.
All wealth components are basically valued on a “realisation” basis, or “the value
obtained in a sale on the open market at the date in question” (see Atkinson and Harrison,
1978, pp. 5-6 for this definition and a discussion of valuation criteria). On the other hand, the
calculation of total household wealth suffers from an inconsistency due to the format of the
questions: real estate and unincorporated businesses are estimated DW￿ WKH￿ WLPH￿ RI￿ WKH
LQWHUYLHZ, whereas all other wealth components are valued DW￿WKH￿HQG￿RI￿WKH￿SUHYLRXV￿\HDU.
We do not correct for this inconsistency.
We take the household as the unit of observation. (In the SHIW individual ownership
is known for real estate only.) The distributions of total wealth and its main components are
computed by weighting each household by either the original or the adjusted sample weights
(see below), without making any allowance for the household size or composition.
￿￿￿￿ 7KH￿TXDOLW\￿RI￿WKH￿6+,:￿ZHDOWK￿GDWD
Comparisons with external sources, such as the national accounts, show that the
quality of income and expenditure estimates in the SHIW is comparable to that of similar
surveys in other countries: for instance, underestimation of disposable income is valued at
around 30 per cent (Brandolini, 1999; see also Cannari and Violi, 1995). Data on wealth, on
the other hand, are typically less reliable and their accuracy tends to vary across different
assets, mis-reporting being lower for tangible assets than financial assets.
The Census provides a useful benchmark to assess the coverage of houses in 1991.
According to the SHIW, the total number of dwellings owned by households (inclusive of
those occupied under a redemption agreement or in usufruct) is 16.9 million, about a quarter
less than in the Census (Table 1). The number of houses occupied by their owners slightly17
exceeds that recorded in the Census, but this over-representation disappears after adjusting
for non-response as discussed below. While respondents are ready to disclose the ownership
of the house where they live, it appears that they are far more hesitant to unveil other
possessions: less than 40 per cent of the dwellings which are not occupied by the owners are
reported among the SHIW assets,
10 even after adjusting for non-response.
Table 1
2:1(56+,3￿2)￿’:(//,1*6￿,1￿￿￿￿￿
(thousands and per cent)













Occupied 17,757 15,171 85.4 14,960 84.2 - -
Owner-occupied (1) 13,419 13,745 102.4 13,393 99.8 13,393 99.8
Rented (2) 3,500 914 26.1 1,028 29.4 - -
Other use 838 512 61.1 539 64.3 - -
Unoccupied 4,571 1,776 38.8 1,843 40.3 - -
Holiday homes (3) - 1,378 - 1,441 - - -
Vacant or other use (4) - 397 - 401 - - -
Total 22,328 16,947 75.9 16,802 75.3 22,940 102.7
of which: not owner-occupied 8,909 3,202 35.9 3,409 38.3 9,547 107.2
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1) and Istat (1995), Table 2.17, p. 96, Table
4.62, p. 453, Table 4.69, p. 461. – (1) Include dwellings occupied under a redemption agreement or in
usufruct. – (2) Dwellings rented all year to persons, households, firms and organisations. – (3) Include
dwellings rented part of the year to persons and households. – (4) Include dwellings used for family
business activity, rented part of the year to firms and organisations, and other unclassified dwellings.
The SHIW total value of real estate falls short of the FANA aggregate by a proportion
varying between 34 per cent in 1993 and 15 per cent in 2000 (Table 2, top panel). (Since the
FANA aggregates include only dwellings while the SHIW figures also cover land and non-
                                                        
10 As noted earlier by Cannari and D’Alessio (1990), estimating the number of rented dwellings owned by
households from tenants’ rather than owners’ answers gives values much closer to the Census figures (3.2
million in 1991).18
residential buildings, the comparison understates the shortfall.) The evaluation for durable
goods is about two thirds of the aggregate figure in the 1990s. Taking tangible assets as a
whole, in the six waves considered the average discrepancy between the SHIW estimate and
the corresponding FANA figure is 26 per cent. Problems are greater for financial assets.
Transaction and savings accounts appear to be underestimated in the SHIW by an average of
64 per cent, government bonds by 70 per cent, and private bonds, company shares and
investment shares by 85 per cent; worryingly, the underestimation varies considerably from
one year to the other (see also Cannari et al., 1990; Cannari and D’Alessio, 1994).
Table 2
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1989 75 85 73 26 39 26 9 58 34 59
1991 67 68 67 21 28 23 10 53 46 54
1993 66 62 66 24 26 27 19 54 57 54
1995 75 62 77 25 26 30 17 60 47 60
1998 81 67 84 28 46 26 19 63 37 63
2000 83 67 85 27 51 46 15 62 36 62
Mean 74 69 75 25 36 30 15 58 43 59
6+,:￿￿DGMXVWHG￿IRU￿QRQ￿UHVSRQVH￿￿QRQ￿UHSRUWLQJ￿DQG￿XQGHU￿UHSRUWLQJ
1989 105 87 108 59 77 67 27 89 34 91
1991 87 69 89 49 49 66 32 75 47 76
1993 81 63 84 52 44 72 47 73 57 73
1995 88 64 92 57 46 75 56 79 48 80
1998 96 70 100 75 89 88 65 89 38 90
2000 97 69 101 72 114 152 47 87 38 89
Mean 92 70 96 61 70 87 46 82 44 83
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1) and other sources as described in Appendix A.
Several reasons can account for the differences between aggregate and survey figures.
•   Survey data are well known to suffer from a tendency of interviewees to under-report,
consciously or not, their wealth. The adjustments for these non-sampling errors19
explained in the next section allow us to reduce substantially these discrepancies. A
further problem for survey-based wealth estimates stems from the high concentration of
wealth and the low probability of including the wealthiest households in the sample. Our
adjustments can do little to correct for this under-representation. In the U.S. Survey of
Consumer Finances and in the Canadian Survey of Financial Security, this problem is
addressed in the survey design through the over-sampling of high-income households.
(But the over-sampling of families of senior white-collar employees, businessmen and
professionals in the SHIW for 1987 gave unsatisfactory results; see Brandolini and
Cannari, 1994, p. 381.)
•   The aggregate figures themselves rest on many measurement hypotheses – as manifest in
Appendix A – and are subject to errors and revisions. For instance, in the last
methodological revision of the Financial Accounts the value of equities held by
households in 1995 was lowered by over 30 per cent, in part owing to the use of a more
comprehensive source on the balance sheets of unlisted companies (see Banca d’Italia,
2002b, p. 50). The aggregate financial balance sheet is especially uncertain for the
household sector, whose holdings are often calculated “residually” by deducting from the
total the holdings of all other institutional sectors.
•   Differences in sector boundaries and variable definitions prevent data from being fully
comparable. Although we were able to separate out financial assets and liabilities of
small unincorporated businesses, still the financial statistics include non-profit
organisations and institutional population, which are not covered by the SHIW.
Moreover, the SHIW respondents may employ valuation criteria which differ from those
underlying aggregate statistics: they might fail to include the interest on deposits accrued
in the year but not yet paid; they rate durable goods at their price in the second-hand
market, or perhaps at their historical cost, whereas national accounts apply substitution
prices to the real stock of durable goods computed with the perpetual inventory method;
they value their house at a subjectively-perceived realisation price while national
accounts would use actual market prices; and so forth.
To sum up, there are large differences between the estimates of household net worth
obtained from aggregate sources, on one side, and the SHIW, on the other. These differences
are due partly to irreconcilable diversities in classifications and definitions, partly to20
shortcomings in both micro and macro sources. Divergence in both levels and time patterns
is a matter of concern and makes it necessary to interpret the SHIW data with prudence, but
it would be wrong to blame them alone for the discrepancies. Being aware of their
deficiencies, we believe that a more complete and reliable analysis of the SHIW wealth data
must explicitly account for underestimation. The discussion of the statistical techniques used
to adjust the SHIW data is the object of the next section.
￿￿￿￿ &RUUHFWLRQV￿IRU￿QRQ￿UHVSRQVHV￿￿QRQ￿UHSRUWLQJ￿DQG￿XQGHU￿UHSRUWLQJ
There is ample evidence that the probabilities of avoiding the interview (non-
response), of being reticent about assets actually owned (non-reporting) and of undervaluing
declared asset holdings (under-reporting) are typically not independent of wealth.
11 This
observation brings us to discard a simple proportional adjustment to FANA aggregates by
constant factors and to prefer methods that take advantage of all available information. We
apply three procedures (see Appendix B for details).
•   The first procedure exploits the figures on the number of contacts needed in the 1998
survey to obtain an interview, as suggested by D’Alessio and Faiella (2002). Households
requiring at least two visits before accepting the interview are assumed to be
representative of non-responding units. Under this assumption, the estimated probability
of not participating in the survey at the first visit, conditional on being interviewed at a
later visit, is a proxy for the unconditional probability of not participating at all, and can
be used to re-calculate weights adjusted for differential response rates across households
with different characteristics (among which income and wealth). This correction can only
partially remedy the under-representation in the sample of very rich households.
•   A model proposed by Cannari et al. (1990) and refined by Cannari and D’Alessio (1993)
is applied to correct for non-reporting and under-reporting of financial assets. The
method is based on the outcome of a statistical matching of the SHIW data for 1987 with
                                                        
11  See Cannari et al. (1990), Cannari and D’Alessio (1990, 1992, 1993) and D’Alessio and Faiella (2002).
On other surveys see, among others, Statistics Canada (1979), Oja (1986), Avery, Elliehausen and Kennickell
(1988), Hayashi, Ando and Ferris (1988), Curtin, Justin and Morgan (1989), Juster and Kuester (1991),
Antoniewicz (2000), Kennickell (2000), Davies and Shorrocks (2000), Morissette, Zhang and Drolet (2002).21
the micro-data from a survey carried out in the same year by the Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro (BNLS) on a sample of its customers. It rests on the assumption that the BNLS
information on respondents’ financial behaviour is more reliable, owing to the trust that
customers are likely to place in their own bank.
•   The third procedure, borrowed from Cannari and D’Alessio (1990), accounts for the non-
reporting of dwellings not occupied by their owners. The procedure is based on the
assumptions that (a) the empirical distribution of the number of dwellings not used as
principal residence recorded in the SHIW is a discrete Poisson distribution (conditional
on certain household characteristics), and (b) the probability of the owners declaring
such dwellings is a binomial distribution. Together, these assumptions imply that the
probability of owning a dwelling other than one’s own residence also follows a Poisson
distribution. This distribution can be estimated and used to impute ownership.
These procedures significantly affect the SHIW evidence. With regard to dwellings,
we have already noticed how the adjustment for non-response brings the number of owner-
occupied houses perfectly into line with the Census total, while it improves only marginally
the estimate for the other dwellings. The latter discrepancy is adjusted through the third
procedure, even if the stochastic nature of the correction leads to an overshooting of the
Census figure by around 7 per cent (Table 1).
Table 3 shows the cumulative impact of the various corrections. In 2000 the share of
households without any financial assets falls from 19 to 16 per cent after correcting for non-
response; it drops to 7 per cent after adjusting also for non- and under-reporting. Owing to
these adjustments, the proportions of holders of transaction and saving accounts and of
government debt rise on average by 15 and 13 percentage points respectively, while that of
holders of private bonds, equities and mutual funds goes up by 5 percentage points.
12 The
share of proprietors of dwellings increases by about 1 percentage point every year with the
adjustment for non-responses, and by a further 2 to 5 points with the adjustment for non- and
under-reporting. The latter has declined steadily over time, thanks to better controls on the
                                                        
12  The fact that the correction for non-reporting is based on data for 1987 may lead to an insufficient
adjustment for equities and investment funds to the extent that their possession was less common in 1987 than
in more recent years.22
SHIW fieldwork, and a probable reduction in tax evasion, and hence household reticence,
brought about by the introduction of the municipality tax on real estate. In general, the
imputation affects mainly households in the lower tail of the wealth distribution. The older
and the less educated the household’s head, the higher is the size of the adjustment. The
correction is larger for households headed by a female, or a self-employed or non-employed
person.
Taking the average over the six waves from 1989 to 2000, the adjustments increase the
mean values of real estate and financial assets by 31 and 148 per cent, respectively (Table 3).
The value of household debts is only affected by the adjustment for non-response and it is
raised by 5 per cent (9 per cent in 2000). Overall, household net worth increases by 41 per
cent. The shortfall with respect to FANA aggregates is reduced from 75 to 39 per cent for
total financial assets, from 26 to 8 per cent for tangible assets, and from 41 to 17 per cent for
net worth (Table 2). In a few cases our procedures lead to estimates exceeding the FANA
values. The corrections, and therefore the remaining discrepancies vis-à-vis aggregate
figures, vary considerably from year to year: the adjusted SHIW data capture between a
minimum of 73 per cent of the FANA net worth in 1993 and a maximum of 91 per cent in
1998.
In general, the adjustments bring the composition of household wealth closer into line
with the aggregate evidence. If we compute the differences, in absolute value, between the
SHIW and the aggregate shares in net worth, we find that they fall considerably, after the
adjustments, in all waves and for every one of the six components reported in Table 2 except
debt. By averaging it out across all waves, the sum of the absolute discrepancies diminishes
from 38 per cent on unadjusted data to 22 per cent on adjusted data.
This summary of the more detailed figures reported in the tables shows the substantial
impact of the correction procedures on the SHIW evidence. Our adjustments are meant to
offer a more realistic description of the distribution of household wealth in Italy. However,
our adjusted results might be regarded with some suspicion – because of an excess of
manipulation. In the light of this consideration, in the following sections we focus on figures
DGMXVWHG for non-response, non-reporting and under-reporting, but we report and







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































At the end of 2000, the DGMXVWHG average net worth of Italian households amounted to
270,000 euros, one third more than in 1989 after correcting for changes in the consumer
price index (Table 4).
13 Between 1989 and 2000 mean wealth has been growing in real terms
by 2.7 per cent per year, while real disposable income has remained virtually unchanged.
Apart from capital gains on some asset holdings, this sustained pace of wealth accumulation
has been made possible by the high propensity to save of Italian households.
Tangible assets account for the largest, if falling, share of wealth: 73 per cent in
2000. The predominance of real assets is largely attributable to home-ownership, which in
Italy is among the highest in the European Union.
14 In 2000 the principal residence was
worth, across all households, an average of 101,600 euros, or 38 per cent of total wealth.
Between 1989 and 2000 this value went up by 61 per cent in real terms, as a result of an
increase in home-ownership (from 65 to 71 per cent) and residence size (from 111 to 118
square meters), but above all owing to an exceptional rise in housing prices, which exceeded
by 40 per cent that of consumer prices. The other real estate properties made up 19 per cent
of net worth in 2000, much less than in 1989. As to the other tangible assets, businesses,
consumer durable goods and valuables accounted for 7, 6 and 2 per cent of wealth,
respectively.
From 1989 to 2000, total financial assets went up from 21 to 29 per cent of wealth,
growing by 6 per cent per year in real terms. This increase was largely driven by investments
in risky assets: the mean real value of private bonds, equities and mutual funds rose by 17
per cent per year, which caused their share in wealth to expand from 3 to 13 per cent. This
substantial shift in household portfolios towards risky assets probably reflects both a true
                                                        
13  We focus on the comparison between 1989 and 2000 for both statistical and economic reasons. First, the
discrepancy between the SHIW estimate for net worth and its aggregate counterpart was relatively low and
similar in the two waves. Secondly, in both years the economic cycle was close to peak.
14  According to the Eurostat’s European Community Household Panel (ECHP), in 1998 the proportion of
households owning their house of residence was 71 per cent in Italy as compared with 69 in the United
Kingdom, 59 in Sweden, 53 in France and 41 in Germany; the proportion was higher only in Greece and
Ireland (74 per cent) and especially Spain (82 per cent). The ECHP fraction of home-owners is somewhat
higher than in the SHIW because it includes houses occupied in usufruct.25
reallocation and the rocketing stock market prices of the late 1990s. Although household
debt increased much more rapidly than gross wealth, its share of wealth appears to be low in
comparison with the FANA statistics.
Table 4
+286(+2/’￿1(7￿:257+￿,1￿7+(￿6+,:
 (euros and per cent)
Wealth component Mean values Share in net worth





Total tangible assets 115,300 164,200 87.7 87.1 3.3
Consumer durable goods 16,800 16,300 12.8 8.6 -0.3
Jewellery and other valuables 3,500 3,900 2.7 2.1 1.0
Principal residence 60,600 94,500 46.1 50.1 4.1
Other real estate 22,400 30,900 17.0 16.4 3.0
Businesses 12,100 18,500 9.2 9.8 3.9
Total financial assets 17,800 27,900 13.5 14.8 4.2
Transaction and savings accounts 10,800 13,100 8.2 6.9 1.8
Government bonds 5,200 4,000 4.0 2.1 -2.4
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds 1,800 10,700 1.4 5.7 17.6
Gross wealth 133,100 192,000 101.2 101.8 3.4
Debt 1,600 3,400 1.2 1.8 7.1
Net worth 131,500 188,600 100.0 100.0 3.3
’LVSRVDEOH￿LQFRPH￿￿￿￿ 26,000 26,400 - - 0.1
$GMXVWHG
Total tangible assets 160,500 195,500 80.0 72.5 1.8
Consumer durable goods 17,700 17,300 8.8 6.4 -0.2
Jewellery and other valuables 3,600 4,300 1.8 1.6 1.6
Principal residence 63,000 101,600 31.4 37.7 4.4
Other real estate 63,300 52,400 31.5 19.4 -1.7
Businesses 12,800 19,900 6.4 7.4 4.1
Total financial assets 41,900 77,900 20.9 28.9 5.8
Transaction and savings accounts 22,300 30,600 11.1 11.4 2.9
Government bonds 13,800 13,500 6.9 5.0 -0.2
Private bonds, equities, mutual funds 5,800 33,700 2.9 12.5 17.3
Gross wealth 202,400 273,400 100.8 101.4 2.8
Debt 1,600 3,700 0.8 1.4 7.9
Net worth 200,700 269,600 100.0 100.0 2.7
’LVSRVDEOH￿LQFRPH￿￿￿￿ 29,700 29,800 - - 0.0
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1). Figures may not add up to totals because of
rounding. Mean values are expressed at 2000 prices by using the consumer price index and are





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All in all, the XQDGMXVWHG figures do not contradict this basic picture. However, the
share of tangible assets is constantly higher than in the adjusted data and, over the period, the
shift towards financial assets looks substantially less pronounced; also changes in the value
of other real estate are rather different. On the other hand, the mean values of principal
residence, businesses, and private bonds, equities and mutual funds rise at very similar
annual growth rate.
Asset holdings and wealth composition vary considerably across classes of the
population ranked by wealth (Table 5). In the bottom fifth of the population, consumer
durables account for the largest fraction of net worth, followed by transaction and savings
accounts (43 and 29 per cent, respectively, in 2000). As much as 16 per cent of the poorest
had no bank or postal account in 2000. In middle classes an overwhelming proportion of
wealth is held in the form of real estate, among which the principal residence represents the
largest share. Businesses and risky financial assets are most frequent among the richest
households. In 2000, 43 per cent of the most affluent twentieth of the population had
businesses and 65 per cent possessed private bonds, equities or mutual funds. While the
ownership of equities and mutual funds spread across all classes during the 1990s, their
amount has come to account for a large proportion of portfolios only among the very rich. In
2000, the top 5 per cent held over 20 per cent of net worth in these assets compared with 4 to
7 per cent in the middle classes and 2 per cent in the poorest fifth.
The cross-section age profile of wealth holdings exhibits the usual hump-shaped
pattern. (Of course, as underlined by Shorrocks, 1975, this pattern has no implications for the
shape of the lifetime profile of wealth ownership. On the age-wealth pattern in the SHIW
data see also Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2000.) We can make two observations, which parallel
analogous comments for household incomes (Brandolini and D’Alessio, 2003). First, some
inter-generational redistribution substantially changed the relationship between 1989 and
2000: the net worth of households whose head is older than 65 increased from 81 to 114 per
cent of the average, while that of those with younger heads fell from 90 to 67 per cent
(Figure 3, left-hand panel). This shift could be due to the ageing of cohorts whose wealth
accumulation benefited from the high growth of the Italian economy in the 1950s and 1960s
and the gradual advent of a relatively generous pension system. It also shows up in the
improved condition of retired heads relative to salaried and self-employed heads (Figure 4,28
left-hand panel). The second observation is that the curvature of the age profile in Italy is
much less pronounced than in Canada and the United States (Figure 3, right-hand panel).
The smaller differences in wealth holdings across generations in Italy may follow from a
generally lower degree of wealth concentration, or a more composite household structure,
whereby the coexistence of several generations within the household makes the classification
based on the head’s age less significant than in the two north American countries.
Figure 3
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Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1) for Italy; Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and
Surette (2000), Tables 1 and 3, pp. 5 and 7, for the United States; Morissette, Zhang and Drolet
(2002), Table 8, p. 29, for Canada.
With regard to regional differences, the average household wealth is higher in the
North and the Centre than in the South and Islands, as a reflection of the different levels of
economic development (Figure 4, right-hand panel; see also Magnani, 1997, Cannari,
D’Alessio and Venturini, 2003, and Cannari and D’Alessio, 2002, for further evidence on
household wealth across Italian regions). This gap is also likely to be influenced by the
greater number of children in southern families. For instance, in 1989 household heads aged
between 31 and 40 had on average 2 living sisters or brothers in the Centre-North compared
with 2.8 in the South. The impact of the larger household size is twofold: it reduces
resources available for the accumulation of wealth during life; it brings about a higher
fragmentation of inheritance at the death of wealth-holders. A significant change in the29
geographical distribution of net worth took place during the 1990s, as the North-South ratio
widened from 1.4 in 1989 to 2.1 in 2000.
Figure 4
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Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1).
￿￿￿:HDOWK￿LQHTXDOLW\
The distribution of household wealth in Italy exhibits the highly asymmetric profile
found in most countries (Figure 5). In 2000 median wealth was 143,000 euros, or 53.1 per
cent of the mean (Table 6). The 95th percentile of the wealth distribution was 5.8 times the
median, while the 95th percentile of the income distribution was 2.8 times. The share in total
wealth of the bottom 40 per cent of Italian households, ranked in ascending order by net
worth, was only 7 per cent, and that of the next 40 per cent was 29 per cent; the remaining 64
per cent was held by the most affluent fifth of the population. The richest 1 per cent of
households possessed 17 per cent of total wealth.
15 The Gini index of concentration was
                                                        
15  Despite our adjustments, the share of the richest households is underestimated owing to their under-
representation. To obtain some understanding, however imprecise, of the size of the wealth controlled by the
wealthiest, we checked the world ranking published by )RUEHV￿0DJD]LQH of (known) billionaires in US dollars.
In 2002, 13 Italian families appeared in )RUEHV￿0DJD]LQH (2002) for a total wealth estimated at 35 billion
dollars, or 0.6 per cent of aggregate household net worth. This proportion compares to the 1.5 per cent owned
by the 61 richest families in the United States and 2.6 per cent owned by the 7 richest families in Canada.30
0.61, a much higher value than the 0.37 found for disposable income. The values of the Gini
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Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1). Non-parametric estimation techniques
implemented using STATA 7.0. Values bottom-coded at the 1st percentile and top-coded at the 99th
percentile. Epanechnicov function is used as kernel and bandwith is selected following a criterion that
approximately minimises the asymptotic mean integrated square error (AMISE). See Pagan and Ullah
(1999), pp. 49-54.
Inequality slightly fell from 1989 to 1991 and then trended sharply upwards in the rest
of the decade (Figure 6). The Gini index diminished from 0.55 in 1989 to 0.54 in 1991,
jumped to 0.58 in 1993 and rose further to 0.61 in 1998. Unadjusted data convey the
impression of a more stable distribution. However, regardless of whether data are adjusted or
not, the Gini index in 1989 is much lower than in 2000, and the difference is significant at
                                                        
16 The correction for non-response tends to increase concentration. On the contrary, correcting for non-
and under-reporting has a mixed impact but predominantly in the direction of reducing dispersion. This pattern
is the net outcome of two different effects (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1993): (a) the adjustment for non-reporting
tends to reduce inequality, because all wealthy households declare they hold bank deposits and, most of them,
government bonds; (b) the correction for under-reporting leads to an increase in inequality, as the phenomenon
matters more for those financial assets, such as private securities, investment fund shares and corporate
equities, held to a much greater extent by the wealthy.31
the 1 per cent level.
17 This conclusion carries over to all Lorenz-consistent inequality
measures, since the Lorenz curve for 1989 lies above that for 2000 at all vingtile points.
Table 6
67$7,67,&6￿2)￿7+(￿’,675,%87,21￿2)￿+286(+2/’￿1(7￿:257+
Statistic 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000
8QDGMXVWHG
Population share (1)
Bottom 40 per cent 7.8 7.1 5.4 6.1 5.8 6.4
Next 40 per cent 34.6 35.5 33.2 33.8 32.0 31.4
Top 20 per cent 57.6 57.5 61.4 60.1 62.3 62.1
Top 10 per cent 40.0 39.2 43.4 42.3 45.6 45.7
Top 5 per cent 27.1 26.0 29.7 28.9 32.5 32.9
Top 1 per cent 10.2 9.0 11.7 10.6 13.8 14.0
Half squared coefficient of variation 1.007 0.857 1.378 1.143 1.974 1.651
Gini index 0.555 0.558 0.601 0.586 0.607 0.601
V￿H￿ (2) ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Mean (3) 131,500 148,800 169,300 168,400 179,800 188,600
Median (3) 84,000 94,700 98,800 102,100 105,500 108,500
$GMXVWHG
Population share (1)
Bottom 40 per cent 8.3 8.2 6.9 7.2 6.6 7.0
Next 40 per cent 33.8 35.2 33.2 33.2 29.9 29.2
Top 20 per cent 57.9 56.6 60.0 59.5 63.5 63.8
Top 10 per cent 40.2 38.7 42.0 42.1 47.5 48.5
Top 5 per cent 27.3 25.6 28.3 29.0 34.8 36.4
Top 1 per cent 10.6 9.3 11.2 10.7 15.5 17.2
Half squared coefficient of variation 1.063 0.860 1.215 1.106 2.044 2.345
Gini index 0.553 0.543 0.579 0.573 0.611 0.613
V￿H￿ (2) ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Mean (3) 200,700 210,500 228,800 223,300 256,300 269,600
Median (3) 121,900 132,300 135,400 133,900 138,700 143,100
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1). – (1) Percentage values. Figures may not
add up to 100 because of rounding. – (2) Asymptotic standard errors of the Gini index calculated
according to the formula derived by Cowell (1989), assuming known mean of sample weights. – (3)
Euros at 2000 prices, rounded to hundreds.
                                                        




0.5, where *L and VHL are the values of the Gini ratio and of its standard error in year L,
respectively. Since this test applies only to independent samples, it is not appropriate for pair comparisons
among figures referring to surveys that include a panel section like the SHIW. To the extent that the panel
section leads to a positive correlation between estimates in subsequent years, the use of the statistic 7LM should
make rejection of the null hypothesis less likely.32
The comparison of the shares in Table 6 shows that the worsening of wealth inequality
from 1989 to 2000 was caused by large gains concentrated at the very top of the distribution:
the richest 5 per cent increased their share by 9.1 percentage points at the expense of the
remaining 95 per cent of the population. This movement is evident in Figure 6 in the













1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Adjusted
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1). On both sides, bars equal twice the
standard error. Asymptotic standard errors are calculated according to the formula derived by Cowell
(1989), assuming known mean of sample weights.
The distribution of financial wealth widened during the 1990s at a much faster pace
than the distribution of net worth. The concentration of the ownership of financial assets rose
dramatically: the Gini index went up from 0.66 in 1991 to 0.81 in 2000 (Figure 7). The
distribution of tangible assets became only slightly more unequal, after some narrowing
between 1989 and 1991. Liabilities, in turn, remained very concentrated. The picture based
on unadjusted data is less neat, but it does not contrast with that just described.
In the next two sections, we decompose the inequality indices to investigate how the
observed shift in household portfolios towards risky assets and the different degree of

















1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Adjusted
Tangible assets Financial assets Debt Net worth
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1).
￿￿￿￿ ’HFRPSRVLWLRQ￿RI￿LQHTXDOLW\￿E\￿ZHDOWK￿FRPSRQHQWV
To understand how the distributions of tangible assets, financial assets and debt
combine to produce the overall degree of inequality, we resort to the decomposition of the
Gini index proposed by Pyatt, Chen and Fei (1980). The Gini coefficient * of net worth Z
can be factorised as:
















where µ  is the mean wealth, µ N is the mean of wealth component N, with µ =Σ Nµ N, *N is the
Gini index of wealth component N, and  )] ( , cov[ )] ( , cov[ N N N Z U Z Z U Z 5 =  is the “rank
correlation ratio”, with U([) being the ranking of households according to variable [. The
rank correlation ratio is equal to unity only if  ) ( ) ( N Z U Z U = , i.e. if households have the same
ranking with respect to Z and ZN. The results of the Gini decomposition are reported in the
first five columns of Table 7.34
Table 7
’(&20326,7,21￿2)￿7+(￿*,1,￿,1’(;￿$1’￿7+(￿9$5,$1&(￿%<￿:($/7+￿&20321(176




















Tangible assets 80.0 0.575 0.971 0.447 80.8 24,426 67.5
Financial assets 20.9 0.677 0.759 0.107 19.4 11,806 32.6
Debt -0.8 0.942 0.154 -0.001 -0.2 -42 -0.1
Net worth 100.0 0.553 1.000 0.553 100.0 36,190 100.0
1991
Tangible assets 83.1 0.571 0.973 0.462 85.0 34,230 83.0
Financial assets 18.2 0.660 0.699 0.084 15.5 7,123 17.3
Debt -1.3 0.923 0.216 -0.003 -0.5 -116 -0.3
Net worth 100.0 0.543 1.000 0.543 100.0 41,237 100.0
1993
Tangible assets 82.8 0.602 0.976 0.487 84.1 68,184 81.8
Financial assets 18.7 0.697 0.733 0.095 16.5 15,331 18.4
Debt -1.5 0.917 0.236 -0.003 -0.6 -135 -0.2
Net worth 100.0 0.579 1.000 0.579 100.0 83,380 100.0
1995
Tangible assets 81.2 0.588 0.971 0.464 80.9 66,153 76.3
Financial assets 20.4 0.727 0.772 0.114 19.9 20,890 24.1
Debt -1.5 0.915 0.330 -0.005 -0.8 -300 -0.3
Net worth 100.0 0.573 1.000 0.573 100.0 86,743 100.0
1998
Tangible assets 73.9 0.607 0.965 0.433 70.8 156,465 63.3
Financial assets 27.3 0.772 0.859 0.181 29.7 91,310 36.9
Debt -1.2 0.929 0.278 -0.003 -0.5 -571 -0.2
Net worth 100.0 0.611 1.000 0.611 100.0 247,204 100.0
2000
Tangible assets 72.5 0.596 0.960 0.415 67.7 155,614 45.6
Financial assets 28.9 0.806 0.871 0.203 33.0 185,948 54.5
Debt -1.4 0.932 0.326 -0.004 -0.7 -609 -0.2
Net worth 100.0 0.613 1.000 0.613 100.0 340,953 100.0
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1). Figures may not add up to totals because of
rounding.  – (1) Divided by 106.
In all years the rank correlation ratio for tangible assets is very close to one, suggesting
that the ranking of households in terms of tangible wealth is very similar to that in terms of
net worth. The proportion of total inequality accounted for by tangible assets fell from 81 per
cent in 1989 to 68 per cent in 2000. Conversely, the contribution of financial assets grew35
from 19 to 33 per cent, as a result of its increased weight in net worth and its much higher
concentration. Ceteris paribus, if the value of the Gini index of financial assets had been the
same in 2000 as in 1989 (i.e. 0.677 instead 0.806), the decomposition in Table 7 suggests
that the Gini index of net worth would have been around 0.58, or 3 percentage points below
its actual value. Alternatively, had the Gini index of tangible assets remained unchanged at
0.575 rather than increasing to 0.596, net worth would have shown a Gini index 1.5 points
below its historical value. Lastly, keeping the wealth composition unchanged, the Gini index
would fall by 1.2 points. This simple decomposition exercise confirms that it was chiefly the
considerable increase in the concentration of financial wealth that imparted the inegalitarian
twist to the overall distribution observed in the 1990s.
Shorrocks (1983) criticised this decomposition of the Gini index on the grounds that it
is one of an infinite variety of potential rules and that it is then arbitrary to choose it over any
other. To counter this objection we have also reported in the last two columns of Table 7 the
results from applying the unique decomposition rule proposed by Shorrocks, whereby the
contribution of wealth component N to total inequality is equal to  ) var( ) , cov( Z Z Z N . The
proportion of inequality attributed to financial assets is constantly higher with Shorrocks’
rule than with the previous rule; the difference is especially marked in 1989 and 2000.
However, the two inequality decompositions provide a consistent picture of the time pattern:
they both point to a remarkable increase in the role of financial assets in explaining total
wealth inequality – an increase which is even greater with the variance decomposition than
the Gini decomposition.
￿￿￿￿ ’HFRPSRVLWLRQ￿RI￿LQHTXDOLW\￿E\￿SRSXODWLRQ￿VXEJURXSV
A second way to identify the factors behind changes in the size distribution of wealth
is through the decomposition of inequality indices by homogeneous subgroups of the
population. The aim of the decomposition is to distinguish the inequality ZLWKLQ the groups
from the inequality DPRQJ the groups. In examining variations over time, we also have to
consider the effect of changes in the UHODWLYH￿VL]H of the groups. Since the Gini index is not
exactly decomposable by population subgroups, we turn to an index of the class of entropy































where ZL is the wealth of household L and Q is the number of households. If households are
partitioned into . groups according to some characteristic, the overall inequality index ( can
be exactly decomposed into within-groups, (














































where subscript N now denotes a population subgroup and SN, µ N and (N are the respective
population share, average wealth, and half squared coefficient of variation. To isolate the













































where we fix the population weights at their values  N S  in a base year and we recalculate the
total mean at fixed weights as  N N N S µ µ Σ = . The within- and between-groups addenda in (4)
are now net of variations in the relative group sizes, and the effect of a changing population
structure is taken up in the residual term (
3. By construction, (
3=0 in the base year.
Table 8 contains the results of decomposition (4). In the top panels we check the effect
of sorting households by five demographic characteristics: household size, area of residence,
sex, age and education of the household head. For all five characteristics, the overall
inequality of net worth is almost entirely attributable to inequality within each group. As
seen above, disparities in mean wealth among households residing in different parts of Italy
are significant. Decomposition (4) shows, however, that these disparities explain little of the
degree of wealth concentration in the country as a whole. What matters is the inequality
inside each region. A similar conclusion is reached for the other groupings. For instance, in
2000 the mean wealth of households where the head had a university degree was 2.7 times
the mean for households where the head had only completed elementary school. Yet,
differences across groups classified by the head’s education only account for 5 per cent of37
total inequality. On these bases, it is no surprise that the time pattern of total inequality
largely tallies with that of the within-group components.
The same decomposition method can be used to shed some light on the way home-
ownership and investment in risky assets determine total inequality (bottom two panels of
Table 8). Even if the average net worth of home-owners was, in 2000, almost 4 times the
average for non-home-owners, this difference contributed only 4 per cent of total inequality.
This contribution was somewhat higher in previous years, but not enough to affect the
temporal trend of the overall index. The spreading of home-ownership, from 65 to 71 per
cent between 1989 and 2000, slightly reinforced the tendency of inequality to rise, as shown
by the constantly negative sign of the relative size effect. This inegalitarian impact is very
strong when households are grouped according to whether or not they possessed private
bonds, equities or mutual funds. Ceteris paribus, the increase in inequality between 1989 and
2000 would have been about a third less than it actually was had the share of households
holding the risky assets in 1989 been equal to that in 2000.
18 This classification also exhibits
a greater inter-group inequality than any other of the groupings under consideration, but even
in this case removing the full difference between group means would not alter the temporal
pattern.
To sum up, the widening of the size distribution of net worth during the last decade
was spread across all population groups and can be attributed only marginally to the
demographic characteristic examined here. The same consideration carries over to the
grouping of households by home-ownership. The increase in the proportion of holders of
risky assets, on the other hand, appears to have amplified, ceteris paribus, the tendency of
inequality to grow.
                                                        
18  The counter-factual value of the index in 1989 is 1.523, i.e. the actual value less the relative size effect.










Value Share Value Share Value Share
+RXVHKROG￿VL]H
1989 1.091 102.7 0.017 1.6 -0.045 -4.2 1.063
1991 0.866 100.7 0.011 1.2 -0.017 -1.9 0.860
1993 1.114 91.7 0.029 2.4 0.071 5.9 1.215
1995 1.045 94.5 0.030 2.8 0.030 2.8 1.106
1998 2.019 98.8 0.014 0.7 0.011 0.5 2.044
2000 2.335 99.6 0.010 0.4 - - 2.345
$UHD￿RI￿UHVLGHQFH (1)
1989 1.041 97.9 0.012 1.2 0.010 0.9 1.063
1991 0.837 97.3 0.014 1.7 0.009 1.0 0.860
1993 1.174 96.7 0.031 2.5 0.010 0.8 1.215
1995 1.064 96.2 0.033 3.0 0.010 0.9 1.106
1998 1.998 97.8 0.037 1.8 0.009 0.4 2.044
2000 2.297 98.0 0.048 2.0 - - 2.345
6H[￿RI￿KRXVHKROG￿KHDG
1989 1.048 98.6 0.006 0.6 0.009 0.8 1.063
1991 0.853 99.1 0.006 0.7 0.002 0.2 0.860
1993 1.197 98.5 0.017 1.4 0.001 0.1 1.215
1995 1.107 100.1 0.010 0.9 -0.011 -1.0 1.106
1998 2.067 101.1 0.014 0.7 -0.037 -1.8 2.044
2000 2.335 99.6 0.010 0.4 - - 2.345
$JH￿RI￿KRXVHKROG￿KHDG (2)
1989 1.007 94.7 0.032 3.0 0.024 2.3 1.063
1991 0.816 94.9 0.021 2.4 0.023 2.7 0.860
1993 1.161 95.6 0.032 2.6 0.021 1.8 1.215
1995 1.048 94.7 0.026 2.4 0.032 2.9 1.106
1998 1.973 96.5 0.012 0.6 0.058 2.9 2.044
2000 2.311 98.6 0.033 1.4 - - 2.345
(GXFDWLRQ￿RI￿KRXVHKROG￿KHDG (3)
1989 1.012 95.2 0.070 6.6 -0.020 -1.8 1.063
1991 0.841 97.7 0.069 8.0 -0.049 -5.7 0.860
1993 1.271 104.6 0.101 8.4 -0.158 -13.0 1.215
1995 1.110 100.3 0.119 10.7 -0.122 -11.1 1.106
1998 1.986 97.2 0.118 5.8 -0.060 -2.9 2.044









Value Share Value Share Value Share
+RPH￿RZQHUVKLS
1989 1.041 97.9 0.060 5.7 -0.038 -3.6 1.063
1991 0.810 94.1 0.068 8.0 -0.018 -2.1 0.860
1993 1.188 97.8 0.086 7.1 -0.060 -5.0 1.215
1995 1.047 94.7 0.092 8.3 -0.033 -3.0 1.106
1998 1.994 97.5 0.082 4.0 -0.032 -1.6 2.044
2000 2.251 96.0 0.094 4.0 - - 2.345
6WRFN￿KROGLQJ (4)
1989 1.423 133.8 0.100 9.4 -0.460 -43.3 1.063
1991 1.010 117.3 0.082 9.5 -0.231 -26.8 0.860
1993 1.457 119.9 0.129 10.6 -0.371 -30.6 1.215
1995 1.261 114.0 0.138 12.4 -0.292 -26.4 1.106
1998 2.008 98.2 0.182 8.9 -0.146 -7.1 2.044
2000 2.207 94.1 0.138 5.9 - - 2.345
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1). “Value” refers to the absolute contribution
of the component to the total index; “share” refers to the percentage ratio of the same contribution to
the total index. Figures may not add up to the total because of rounding. – (1) The five areas of
residence are: North-West, North-East, Centre, South, and Islands. – (2) Household heads are grouped
by age in twelve classes: under 26 years, from 26 to 30 and then nine other classes of 5 years each, 76
and over. – (3) The five levels of education of household heads are none, elementary school, middle
school, high school, and university degree. – (4) Stock-holding refers to the possession of private
bonds, equities or mutual funds.
￿￿￿&RQFOXGLQJ￿UHPDUNV
This paper was concerned with the size distribution of household wealth in Italy. We
assembled aggregate data to sketch the evolution of household portfolios over the last forty
years and to provide a benchmark for the microeconomic evidence. This evidence was based
on the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a long-established sample
survey which has gathered detailed and exhaustive information on the net worth of Italian
households since 1987.
The limits of sample surveys for the study of wealth distribution are well-known, and
have led some researchers to question their usefulness altogether. A more balanced view was
taken by Atkinson and Harrison (1978) in their extensive investigation of the personal
distribution of net worth in Britain:40
“The experience to date suggests that sample surveys are unlikely by themselves to
provide a fully satisfactory source of information about the size distribution of wealth
as a whole. … Sample surveys may be a valuable supplement to the estate data,
throwing light on the wealth not covered by the estate returns; they may also provide
useful information about the holdings of certain types of asset (e.g. consumer
durables). But in our view they cannot provide an alternative to the estate method as a
source of evidence about wealth-holding at the top of the scale.” (pp. 274-5).
Nevertheless, sample surveys are the primary source for wealth distribution in countries like
Canada and the United States. In both countries, the under-representation of the wealthiest is
brought under control by over-sampling high-income households.
Our SHIW data suffer from the problems of sample surveys and do not benefit from
over-sampling. In this paper, we documented non-response and mis-reporting in the SHIW
and we observed large differences between the survey totals and the corresponding aggregate
estimates. While being a matter of concern, these differences are not to be blamed wholly on
the SHIW: they are due in part to irreconcilable diversities in classifications and definitions,
in part to shortcomings in macro sources. We dealt with non-response, non-reporting and
under-reporting in our data by performing several statistical adjustments. We believe that the
adjusted data paint a more realistic portrait of the distribution of household net worth in
Italy, but we also reported the evidence for unadjusted data in order to show the robustness
of our conclusions and their sensitivity to these statistical adjustments. In spite of the
corrections, the results still reflect the imprecise representation of the upper tail of the wealth
distribution, and we reiterate the warning to interpret them with caution.
On the substantive side, the main results presented in the paper are the following.
•   The aggregate figures show that dwellings and more generally tangible assets are still the
main component of household wealth. The share of total financial assets has fluctuated
over the years, but has increased only modestly. The investment in risky assets grew
considerably during the 1990s, in parallel with the stock market boom and the rapid
privatisation of state-owned corporations and public utilities. The portfolio composition
has tilted again towards tangible assets in the last couple of years, with the fall in share
prices and rise in house prices.
•   According to the SHIW adjusted data, at the end of 2000 the average net worth of Italian
households amounted to 270,000 euros. From 1989 to 2000, it grew in real terms by 2.741
per cent each year, while real disposable income remained unchanged. During the same
period, households of the elderly, the retired, and people living in the North experienced
the highest increase in mean net worth.
•   Asset holdings vary considerably across the wealth distribution. At the bottom, consumer
durables account for the largest fraction of net worth. In middle classes a very high
proportion is held in real estate, particularly the principal residence. Businesses and risky
financial assets are most frequent among the richest. While the ownership of equities and
mutual funds spread across all classes during the 1990s, their amount came to account
for a large proportion of portfolios only among the very wealthy.
•   The distribution of wealth is a lot more unequal than the distribution of income. In 2000
the Gini index was 0.61 for net worth, compared with 0.37 for disposable income; it was
0.60 for tangible assets, and a much higher 0.81 for financial assets.
•   Wealth inequality declined from 1989 to 1991 and then rose considerably in the rest of
the 1990s. The increase was driven by large gains at the very top of the distribution.
•   Our decompositions of inequality indices show that a great deal of the widening of
household wealth distribution was due to financial assets, which have both augmented
their weight in portfolios and become more heavily concentrated. This evidence suggests
that the stock market boom of the 1990s was an important factor behind the recent
growth of wealth inequality.
How does Italian wealth distribution compare with that of other countries? Let us
consider the United States, and in particular the evidence of the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF, Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and Surette, 2000). On the basis of our adjusted
data, in 1998 the PHDQ Italian household was almost as rich as the mean U.S. household
(274,200 vs. 282,500 U.S. dollars, at average market exchange rate), whereas the PHGLDQ
household was twice as rich as its American counterpart (148,400 vs. 71,600 U.S. dollars).
With unadjusted data, the mean household was poorer in Italy than in the United States by
about a third, but the median household was still richer by almost 60 per cent. These results
are rather surprising – especially in the light of the divergent performance of the two
economies in the 1990s. Several factors can help to explain them. There are important
differences in institutional settings, for instance in the role of private pensions, as well as in42
demography – the average family size is 2.6 persons in the SCF and 2.8 in the adjusted
SHIW, while the shares of household heads older than 54 are 34.2 and 43.1 per cent,
respectively. Moreover, the household saving rate has traditionally been far higher in Italy
than in the United States, implying a stronger wealth accumulation even when American
incomes grow faster.
19 On the other hand, differences in statistical methodology and
definitions are so large that these figures can only be very rough approximations. At face
value, however, these figures, and more generally all available evidence, seem to suggest
that the distribution of household wealth is much narrower in Italy than in the United
States.
20 In-depth work to improve data comparability is necessary to ascertain whether these
international differences are statistical artefacts, or true ones. This task is left for future
research.
21
                                                        
19  A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that an economy with a constant saving rate of 16 per
cent and an annual real income growth of 1.3 per cent accumulates in ten years 80 per cent more than an
economy where the saving rate equals 6 per cent and income grows at 1.9 per cent per year, assuming that the
initial income of the first economy is 69 per cent of the income of the second economy (these values are the
actual per capita values in the 1990s for Italy and the United States, respectively).
20  See Faiella and Neri (2004) for a direct comparison, and Wolff (1998, 2000) and Kennickell (2001) for
further estimates for the United States. The problems of international comparisons of wealth inequality are
discussed by Wolff (1991, 1996), Kessler and Wolff (1991) and Davies and Shorrocks (2000).
21  This is the aim of the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), an international co-operative project launched
in 2003 to create from existing data a database on household net worth comparable cross-nationally. The LWS
project has currently the support of Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and the United States. For further information, see the web-site <www.lisproject.org/lws.htm>.$SSHQGL[￿$￿￿&RQVWUXFWLRQ￿RI￿DJJUHJDWH￿VWDWLVWLFV
In this Appendix we describe sources and methodology underlying the aggregate
FANA statistics examined in Section 2. We deal separately with durable goods, dwellings,
and financial assets and liabilities. We report the reconstructed time series in Table A1 and
the percentage composition of total household net worth in Table A2.
’XUDEOH￿FRQVXPHU￿JRRGV
Following Pagliano and Rossi (1992), the stock of durable goods is computed by
applying the perpetual inventory method to reconstructed series for the expenditure at
constant prices on four different categories of durables, assuming exponential depreciation
and retirement of the goods after a fixed number of years (20 years for furniture and
furnishings, and 10 years for household equipment, transport, and TV, HI-FI and computer
equipment). As standard in national accounts, the current values of the stock are expressed at
substitution prices by multiplying the series at constant prices by the deflator of the
corresponding expenditure.
’ZHOOLQJV
The stock of dwellings at constant prices for the years 1980-2001 is based on a series
provided by the Italian statistical office (Istat) calculated as part of the estimation of the
capital stock. It is brought back to 1965 by keeping constant the depreciation rate for 1981,
i.e. the ratio of consumption of fixed capital in 1981 to net capital in 1980, both evaluated at
constant prices. The series is then expressed at market prices, rather than substitution prices,
by using the housing price series estimated by Muzzicato, Sabbatini and Zollino (2002)
(MSZ). The MSZ price series is based on information assembled in a semiannual survey of
real estate agents and refers to actual sales of houses recently built in provincial capital
towns in the second semester of each year. The price for the whole stock of houses is derived
by scaling down this series by 0.73, or the ratio of the average value per square meter for all
houses to the corresponding value for houses recently built in provincial capitals as
measured in the SHIW for 1993. The benchmark value of the stock of dwellings in 1991 is
obtained by multiplying this adjusted price by the total area of Italian dwellings as registered
in the Census. Figures for other years are derived by adjusting the 1991 value for the
variations in both the real stock of dwellings and the adjusted MSZ price index. Finally, we
assume that throughout the period under consideration households owned a fraction of total
dwellings (occupied and unoccupied) equal to 91 per cent, which is the value found in both
the 1981 and 1991 Censuses.
)LQDQFLDO￿DVVHWV￿DQG￿OLDELOLWLHV
The Bank of Italy started to publish the Financial Accounts in its $QQXDO￿5HSRUW for
1964. Here, we use the tables compiled by Cotula and Caron (1971) for the period 1965-
1970 and by Marotta (1988) for the period 1975-1986, while we derive the data for 1971-7444
and 1987-88 from the $QQXDO￿5HSRUWV of the Bank of Italy. For the years from 1989 to 2002
we rely on the Financial Accounts database available at the Economic Research Department
of the Bank of Italy (as of 19 June 2003). The access to this internal source allows us to
produce figures for the entire period for consumer households alone, i.e. the sub-sector
excluding unincorporated enterprises. (The publication of separate accounts for the two sub-
sectors comprising the household sector has been suspended since the adoption of the new
system of national accounts, ESA 1995.) These unpublished figures are preliminary and
subject to revision.
The data assembled contain many discontinuities brought about by methodological
revisions, use of better sources, or the appearance of new financial instruments. A major
break occurs in 1989 and coincides with the first release of quarterly series. These
discontinuities are not corrected except in one case. Following the adoption of ESA 1995,
the comparison of new figures with earlier ones shows, in 1995-97, an upward revision of
transaction and savings accounts by 13 per cent and a downward revision of equities by an
average 36 per cent. Both variations were generated by the use of more comprehensive
sources on the banking system and unlisted companies, respectively. As these revisions
appear to have affected mostly levels rather than dynamics, we re-scale values prior to 1995
by the ratio between new and old figures as recorded in 1995. This re-scaling extends back
to 1965 for transaction and savings accounts and to 1989 for equities.
Transaction and savings accounts include bank accounts, postal accounts and deposits
at special credit institutions (the separation between banks and special credit institutions was
abolished in 1993), and from 1989 onwards repurchase agreements. Long-term government
bonds include those issued by local governments and public utilities. Other long-term
domestic bonds comprise those issued by private enterprises and special credit institutions.
Equities refer only to Italian stocks and include the shares of listed and unlisted incorporated
businesses and the net capital of unincorporated banks not owned by the state; shares of
unincorporated businesses are excluded. Foreign assets include short- and long-term bonds,
equities, shares of mutual funds and other credits: the actual coverage of different assets may
vary as a consequence of the controls on capital outflows in force for many years until the
late 1980s. Insurance technical reserves also cover pension funds. Other assets include bank
acceptances. Debts comprise all short- and long-term liabilities including loans by special
credit institutions, mortgages by insurance companies and pensions funds, consumer credits





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Non-response is a problem in statistical surveys whenever it leads to samples where
the less co-operative segments of the population are under-represented, thus generating
biased estimates (Cohen and Carlson, 1995). To limit these potentially distorting effects in
the SHIW, particular attention is devoted in the fieldwork to elicit households’ co-operation,
although no money compensation is envisaged. When processing the data, the sample is
post-stratified on the basis of certain characteristics of the household head (sex, age and
work status) to align the sampling distribution with distributions derived from external
sources like the Census or the labour force survey. Post-stratification permits correction for
those differences in the households’ propensity to participate which are ascribable to the
characteristics considered in the post-stratification (e.g. Madow, Nisselson and Olkin, 1983).
However, standard post-stratification techniques cannot fully compensate for the bias
induced by the lower propensity of richer households to take part in sample surveys, as
wealth is typically not an available characteristic (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1992; D’Alessio
and Faiella, 2002).
D’Alessio and Faiella (2002) examine a few alternative models to estimate the ex-ante
probability of participating in the SHIW and find that they tend to produce similar results.
The model that can be most easily replicated for the various surveys exploits the information
on the number of contacts needed to obtain an interview. More precisely, it assumes that the
households requiring at least two visits before conceding the interview are representative of
non-responding units as a whole. Under this assumption, the unconditional probability of
responding in the survey is taken to coincide with the estimated probability of responding at
the first visit. Once such probability  UL S  is available, an unbiased estimator of the population




























,( B 1 )
where SL is the usual probability of selection and 5 is the number of responding households.
To obtain unbiased estimates, we borrow the procedure proposed by D’Alessio and
Faiella (2002) and adjust the sampling weights as in (B1). The estimate of a logistic model
on 1998 data reported in Table B1 shows that the non-response probability rises with school
attainment, household size, income, and wealth; it is higher in the North, and in smaller
municipalities; it falls with the age of the household head up to the age of 60 and then it
increases. These parameters are fitted to other surveys, after re-scaling income and wealth by
the ratio of each year average to the corresponding 1998 average, and calibrating the model
intercept to allow for the different response rates in each survey. The adjusted sampling
weights are finally post-stratified to re-establish the marginal distributions of components by
sex, age group, type of job, geographical area and demographic size of the municipality of












Intercept 0.317 0.383 0.682 0.409
Poorly educated -0.118* 0.064 3.422 0.064 -0.031 0.889
Highly educated 0.255** 0.101 6.336 0.012 0.041 1.290
North 0.604*** 0.072 70.499 0.000 0.166 1.830
South 0.278*** 0.082 11.573 0.001 0.069 1.320
Small municipality 0.628*** 0.074 73.025 0.000 0.129 1.875
Age -0.081*** 0.010 70.965 0.000 -0.792 0.922
Age squared 0.001*** 0.000 64.666 0.000 0.769 1.001
Household size 0.085*** 0.024 12.722 0.000 0.060 1.089
Log of income 0.123*** 0.032 14.838 0.000 0.072 1.131
Log of real wealth 0.004 0.006 0.452 0.502 0.010 1.004
Log of financial wealth 0.022*** 0.007 10.419 0.001 0.054 1.022
Model Fitting Information and Testing Global Null Hypothesis BETA=0
Criterion Intercept Only Intercept and covariates χ
2  for covariates
AIC 9,147.864 8,805.922 -
SC 9,154.694 8,887.885 -
-2 LOG L 9,145.864 8,781.922 363.942 with 11 DF
(p=0.0001)
Score - - 353.943 with 11 DF
(p=0.0001)
Source: our calculations on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.1). * Significant at a 10 per cent confidence
level; ** significant at a 5 per cent confidence level; *** significant at a 1 per cent confidence level.
$GMXVWPHQW￿IRU￿QRQ￿UHSRUWLQJ￿DQG￿XQGHU￿UHSRUWLQJ￿RI￿ILQDQFLDO￿DVVHWV
The adjustment builds on a method originally proposed by Cannari et al. (1990) based
on the integration of the SHIW data for 1987 with the micro-data from a survey carried out
in the same year by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNLS) on a sample of its customers. The
BNLS was not representative of the Italian population, but had the advantage of providing
more reliable information on interviewees’ financial behaviour, owing to the greater trust
that customers are likely to place in their own bank. Indeed, after allowing for the different
composition of the two samples, Cannari et al. (1990) found that SHIW figures fell short of
the corresponding BNLS aggregates by about a half, under-reporting being higher for the
households of the elderly, the less educated and the self-employed. As adjustment for under-
reporting proposed by Cannari et al. (1990) requires the availability of both the SHIW and
the BNLS at the same time and no further BNLS has been carried out since 1987, we apply
the updated and revised methodology developed by Cannari and D’Alessio (1993). The
procedure works in three steps.49
•   ,PSXWDWLRQ￿ RI￿ EDQN￿ DQG￿ SRVWDO￿ GHSRVLWV.  – Assuming that there are no households
reporting an asset without holding it, the probability of holding an asset conditional on
not declaring it,  QG K 3 / , can be computed on the basis of marginal probabilities as:
() () G K QG K 3 3 3 − − − = 1 1 1 / (B2)
where  K 3  is the unconditional probability of holding an asset and  G 3  the unconditional
probability of declaring it. While  G 3  can be estimated from the SHIW data as a function
of household characteristics (such as the head’s age and education, income, etc.), the
estimate of  K 3  has to rely on external information. Let the asset be a bank deposit.
Suppose that the logarithm of the probability of declaring a bank deposit is proportional
to the logarithm of the probability of holding it and is independent of household
characteristics:
K G 3 N 3 log log = (B3)
(in so far as  1 ≤ G 3 , (B3) implies that  1 ≤ K 3  as well). Suppose also that the ratio  K G 3 3 ,
i.e. the probability of reporting bank deposits conditional to holding at least one account,
is equal, on average, to the ratio of the survey-based total of bank accounts to the
corresponding figure derived from the statistics on the banking system, U:
()() U 3 ( 3 ( K G = (B4)
where ( stands for expected value. Together (B3) and (B4) allows for the estimation of
the parameter N, and then of the probability of holding bank deposits  K 3 . Equation (B2)
is then used for imputation. This method has the desirable properties that  G 3  is always
less than  K 3  and the two probabilities are positively correlated. As  G 3  increases with
income, the latter feature prevents the imputation of bank deposits to the poorest
households in the sample. For lack of better information, this method, including the
estimated value for N, is also applied to postal deposits.
•   ,PSXWDWLRQ￿ RI￿ ILQDQFLDO￿ DVVHWV￿￿ H[FOXGLQJ￿ EDQN￿ DQG￿ SRVWDO￿ GHSRVLWV.  – Under the
assumption that they are not affected by non-reporting behaviour, the BNLS data allow
us to compute  K 3  as a function of household characteristics. (B2) can be used to impute
the holding of an asset to non-reporting households. The amounts are subsequently
imputed using standard imputation techniques. They are obviously under-reported to the
same extent as non-imputed data.
•   $GMXVWPHQW￿IRU￿XQGHU￿UHSRUWLQJ￿RI￿ILQDQFLDO￿DVVHWV. – The logarithm of the true amount of
financial assets  L Z  is assumed to be a linear function of characteristics  L [  of household L:
L L L X E [ E Z + + = 0 log (B5)
As above, the BNLS data are supposed to be unaffected by under-reporting and used to
estimate (B5). Assuming that the true amount  L Z  is under-reported by a multiplicative50
factor related to household characteristics, the declared amount 
G
L Z  is equal to 
L L Y D [ D H
+ + 0







L X E [ E Z + + = 0 log (B6)
on the SHIW data, the true amount can be recovered as
$
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−− − + − 00 0.( B 7 )
For further details and the full set of estimates see Cannari and D’Alessio (1993).
We use the estimates from 1987 data to correct for non- and under-reporting in
subsequent years. Available data do not allow us to test the maintained assumption that
households’ reporting behaviour has not varied over the period. It is reassuring, however, to
note that the extent of interviewees’ reticence in 1987 was not very different from that found
by Ulizzi (1967) twenty years earlier (Cannari and D’Alessio, 1993, p. 400).
$GMXVWPHQW￿IRU￿QRQ￿UHSRUWLQJ￿RI￿GZHOOLQJV
We correct for the under-reporting of dwellings caused by non-sampling errors by
adapting a method discussed by Cannari and D’Alessio (1990). The empirical distribution of
the number of houses recorded in the SHIW, excluding those where the household lives, is
well approximated by a discrete Poisson distribution, identified by the parameter  ) ([ G λ ,
where [ is a vector of household characteristics (including sex, age and age squared of the
household head, income, income squared, place of residence, municipality size, household
size, home-ownership, annual dummy). Lacking more precise information, we assume that
all dwellings not used as principal residence are equally likely to be declared by the owners.
The probability that one of these dwellings is declared in the SHIW can then be described by
the binomial distribution
()
) ( ) 1 ( | Pr
G V G S S
G
V







= = = ,( B 8 )
where V is the number of dwellings owned (excluding the household residence),  V G ≤  is the
number of those declared and S is the proportion of these dwellings recorded in the SHIW.
Equation (B8) implies that the probability distribution of houses actually owned (excluding
the household residence) is the same as that of declared houses or, more precisely, it is a
Poisson distribution with parameter  S [ [ G V ) ( ) ( λ = λ . By computing  () G ’ V 6 = = | Pr , it is
then possible to impute the ownership of non-reported dwellings. Characteristics and value
are assigned by a hot-deck method controlling for geographical area and income brackets.
For each year, the proportion S is computed as the ratio of the number of dwellings owned
by the households (excluding the household residence) recorded in the SHIW, after the
adjustment for non-response, to the corresponding “true” figure. The latter figure is taken
from the Census for 1991 (so that S=0.383; see Table 1); it is extrapolated on the basis of the
average rate of growth of the number of family-owned dwellings as recorded in the Censuses
of 1981 and 1991 for other years.51
As in the SHIW respondents are requested to complete a separate sheet for each
dwelling they own, failing to report certain assets is a way of reducing the answering burden.
The method just described – that can be seen as the equivalent of a proportional adjustment
rule for a discrete variable – can account for such non-reporting behaviour, but relies on the
crucial assumption that the degree of reticence of respondents is constant across socio-
economic characteristics and, in particular, wealth classes. Some indirect evidence that the
adjustment works satisfactorily is provided by the similarity of the distributions of rental
incomes in the adjusted SHIW data and in tax returns, although it may still slightly
underestimate the under-reporting of the richest households.5HIHUHQFHV
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